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Lecture
Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the
Constitution Through a Pseudo-

Scientific Sieve
By LAURENCE H. TRIBE*
Judge Peckham, Chief Justice Bird, distinguished members of the
Supreme Court of California, Mrs. Tobriner, Dean Prunty, ladies and
gentlemen: To say that I am honored and grateful to be here this afternoon, delivering the second annual Tobriner Memorial Lecture,1 would
be a wild understatement. I'm more than honored: I'm humbled, and

I'm overwhelmed.
I remember so well how I felt in the first days of my clerkship with
Justice Tobriner, just a bit more than eighteen years ago today. In a way
it feels like yesterday, even though so much has changed. Neither my
daughter Kerry nor my son Mark had yet been born-although Mark,
who will be eighteen soon, was on his way. The world itself has changed,
too. In those days, Ronald Reagan was running for his first public office,
the governorship of California. Earl Warren had completed fewer years
as Chief Justice than Warren Burger has now served in his tenure as
Chief. Sandra Day O'Connor was Assistant Attorney General of Arizona. William H. Rehnquist was a partner in a Phoenix law firm.
As I say, much has changed. But much abides. The spirit that was
Mat Tobriner's is still with us, stilled in part by his absence, but soaring
in the memories and in the work that all who learned from him, and
loved him, try to carry on.
If anyone had told me, in those first days of my genuinely inspiring
*

Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.

1. I am grateful to the Tobriner Committee and Hastings College of the Law for inviting
me to deliver this address in San Francisco on October 18, 1984. Rather than turning what
was a largely extemporaneous lecture into a full-dress article, I have decided, on the advice of
many of those who were there, to preserve the flavor of the occasion by reproducing an essentially unadorned version of the transcript of my remarks as the Second Tobriner Memorial
Lecturer.
[1551
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clerkship with the judge, that I would be standing here today, delivering
the second annual lecture in his memory, following Judge Skelly Wright
to this distinguished podium, I would have said, "You're crazy." And if
I could have peered into the future, seen myself here today, with the
judge no longer here, I would have felt a deep sadness-and then fallen
speechless.
'2
It was Tennyson who wrote "I am a part of all that I have met."
For having met Mathew Tobriner, whose thoughts and hopes became a
part of me, I will always be grateful. Among Mat's most enduring lessons was one that recalls Tennyson: All of us become a part of the world
we choose. We do not just inherit society, we help create it. The choices
that we make as lawyers, as people, do much more than serve some mix
of already existing "interests" and "values." Our choices shape what our
interests and values are by constituting who and what we ourselves become. To construe and build the law, especially constitutional law, is to
choose the kinds of people, the kind of society, that we will be.
For Justice Tobriner it was vital that those choices be animated,
above all, by human concern and humane compassion. It was Mat's concern that all legal decisions advance human dignity, even when that
means judges balking at bureaucratic imperatives, defying the demands
of efficiency and casting aside the claims of exalted authority.
My lecture today will explore a very different vision of what courts
should do-a vision of court as calculator, which seeks less the vindication of justice than the budgeting of rights. It is a vision that seeks less
"equal justice under law" than "efficient policy through bureaucratic
rule." It is a managerial vision of deference to authority and expertise,
couched in the technocratic garb of "cost-benefit analysis," and reinforced by the illusory precision and the pretended neutrality of a pseudoscientific calculus for measuring claims and counterclaims.
I hope to show, in as much detail as our very limited time together
will permit, how this technocratic vision is coming to dominance in the
Burger Court, what it means for human rights and for the judicial mission, and why I believe with all my being that it should be criticized and
combatted as a profound perversion, even if an unintended one, of the
perspective from which any genuine constitutional court ought to view
and help to shape the political and social world. My plan is to do that by
describing what I regard as the seven characteristic facets-for some they
may be virtues; as you will soon see, for me they are decidedly vices-of
the technocratic mode that I see the current Supreme Court deploying. I
2. Tennyson, Ulysses, in

THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY

402 (Shorter ed. 1983).
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think of them, only slightly tongue-in-cheek, as the "Seven Deadly Sins
of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve."
Let me turn to sin number one-the sin of devaluing process, of
ignoring the independent value of respecting personal dignity and security in the means that government uses to achieve its ends.
One of my favorite stories comes from the Midrash. It is said that,
before God expelled Adam from the Garden of Eden for eating of the
Tree of Life, He gave Adam a moment to regain his composure and
asked him why he had taken a bite. You might wonder about the reason
for God's inquiry. Surely it was not to reduce the risk of divine error-to
minimize the costs of an inefficient adversarial processs. It was a matter
of process for its own sake, rather like the code of Wild Bill Hickock:
never shoot a man until you've looked him in the eye. That is, God's
inquiry was an affirmation of the dignity even of those who had strayed.
That's rather hard to capture in a cost-benefit analysis, and for years now
the United States Supreme Court has been talking about values like those
of procedural fairness as though they were simply tools, instruments,
means to the end of maximizing the size of the total pie for society rather
than things substantively valued in themselves. As I say, it's been going
on for years, but the trend has accelerated and has taken on a sinister
intensity.
The values of process are hardest to weigh in a calculus of costs and
benefits. I think the most telling illustrations of the difficulty come from
the Court's now well-known decisions of the past Term with respect to
illegal search and seizure and illegal interrogation. I have in mind, of
course, the cases of United States v. Leon, 3 a fourth amendment case, and
New York v. Quarles,4 a case arising under the fifth amendment. In Leon,
the Court in essence held that the costs of more lost convictions outweigh
the benefits of incremental deterrence when police make a reasonable
mistake based on an invalid search warrant. 5 Now, in that kind of
calculus, the costs will always seem weightier than the benefits. The benefits will be elusive, intangible, diffuse. Costs will be visible and concrete:
"There he goes, getting away, someone who committed a crime!" Of
course, what that calculus doesn't even begin to account for is the sense
in which the judiciary itself, whenever it admits illegally obtained evidence, abridges the "security" from "unreasonable searches and
seizures" that the fourth amendment, I had thought, promised us all.
3. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). The companion case was Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.
Ct. 3424 (1984).
4. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 3421.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

That calculus fails to take into account the story that is told of official
lawlessness when judges themselves become accomplices in illegality.
But such blindness is the natural consequence of a cost-benefit approach
to these matters.
Or consider the fifth amendment decision, New York v. Quarles, a
case which holds that, when the public safety makes it "reasonable" to
interrogate without giving warnings, then the costs of excluding the re6
sulting confession exceed the benefits, despite the violation of Miranda.
I'm happy to say that even Justice O'Connor dissented from that conclusion.7 The Court didn't account for the violation of the defendant's
rights against compelled self-incrimination by the lower court's use of a
coercively obtained confession, even if public safety made it entirely understandable and reasonable for the police to do exactly what they did.
The general danger illustrated by both of these decisions is a danger
well put by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Leon.8 He speaks there of
the "narcotic effect," the "illusion of technical precision and ineluctability," which comes when we allow ourselves to talk like little
scientists about the costs and benefits of these various rules. 9 It is well
put by Justice Marshall in his dissent in the Quarlescase when he speaks
of the "pseudo-scientific precision" of cost-benefit rhetoric in this
realm. 10
But there is another, and in some ways more substantive, danger:
that focusing exclusively on the marginal costs and benefits of enforcing
these rules ignores concerns for equality that underlay the Warren
Court's movement in this direction in the first instance. The entire criminal procedure revolution was born not of some perverse desire to make
the task of the police more difficult. The notion that we should warn
suspects of their rights was born of the idea that, if the rich know of their
rights already, the poor at least ought to be told. It was Mat Tobriner
who prefigured that development in his landmark decision in People v.
12
Dorado,1 a decision that helped pave the path for Miranda v. Arizona.
But it's hard to weigh the costs and benefits of equality. Equal justice
doesn't fit easily into any such calculus.
And that leads me to the second sin of which I think the current
Court is guilty: the sin of ignoring distributive concerns, the way in
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

104 S. Ct. at 2632 (Miranda v. Arizona is found at 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
104 S. Ct. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
104 S. Ct. at 2645 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (Tobriner, J.).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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which alternative rules affect the relative power of rich and poor in our
society. I'm sure a number of you are familiar with the law and economics literature centered at the University of Chicago. It is revealing in
many respects-among them, in the respect that it treats the distribution
of income and wealth in society as a given, as though it were some kind of
geological circumstance. That mode of inquiry asks only, "How can we
maximize total utility, given a particular distribution of wealth and
power?" In that world view, the inability to pay is a meaningless concept; those who don't buy something simply haven't decided to give up
enough of everything else. And the Supreme Court is largely accepting
that world view, even in cases involving freedom of speech-which earlier Courts had thought ought to be a freedom, above all others, available
not only to those who can pay the price.
Two examples will have to suffice in this lecture, although many
more might be put forth. The first will come from California, the case of
Members of City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent.13 In that case, the Los
Angeles City Council imposed a ban on the posting of signs on public
property, including campaign posters on telephone poles. It did so, the
Court said, in order to reduce "visual clutter." 14 The Supreme Court
upheld the ban by a vote of six to three. Those who urged a different
result objected that the obvious impact of this rule in Los Angeles was to
silence the poor in a discriminatory way. Very few wealthy people need
to stick posters on telephone poles; other means of more effective communication are available to them. The Court's reply? In essence, it was
this: The rule is neutral on its face. And the legislature decided that its
benefits outweighed its costs. 15 The poor responded: Back in the late
1930's and early 1940's, the Supreme Court had held, after all, that
leafletting on the streets and from door to door is protected because, for
the poor, that is "one of the most accepted techniques of seeking popular
support."' 6 Even a neutral ban on leafletting, the Court had held as early
as 1939, is therefore unconstitutional.1 7 The current Court's terse reply?
The special "solicitude" shown for the poor in those cases "has practical
8
boundaries."1
Let me give you another example. The case is Clark v. Community
13. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
14. Id. at 2130.
15. Id. at 2135.
16. See, eg., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of
circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
17. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
18. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2133 & n.30.
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for Creative Non- Violence.' 9 In that case, by a vote of seven to two, the
current Court upheld the Interior Department's ban on sleeping in Lafayette Park. People could lie down, but if they dozed off they violated

the ban. And that was true even though they were there not for the fun
of it, or for shelter alone, but to demonstrate the plight of homelessness.
I know that Mat Tobriner would have seen the message of the derelicts
there along with the ordered beauty of Lafayette Park. Chief Justice

Bird reminded us of that.20 But not the current Court. Government officials, that Court in effect said, have struck a reasonable balance between
order and plight, and we should defer to that balance.2 ' Justice Marshall
dissented.2 2 He said that his brethren and sister of the majority had ig-

nored how bureaucrats tend to overregulate the powerless, adding that
23
the Court has become remarkably insensitive to the plight of the poor.

In effect, the Court held in CCNV that the Department of the Interior
may forbid rich and poor alike to sleep in the parks of Washington, D.C.,

in an echo of the majestic equality of French law that Anatole France
described so well so long ago.
But actually, this Term's Anatole France Award goes not to Clark
v. Community for Creative Non- Violence but to a case called Selective
Service System v. Minnesota PublicInterest Research Group.2 4 The holding of that case was not particularly remarkable in itself. Indeed, I think
I might be prepared to defend the outcome. In that case the Court held

that it was permissible to withhold federal financial aid from students
who did not certify that they had complied with their Selective Service
104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
See Bird, Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner-TheHeart of a Lion, The Soul of a Dove, 70
CALIF. L. Rnv. 871 (1982):
He had a clarity of vision that was, indeed, rare. From his office window he viewed a
nearby park and in it he saw a pattern of the life around us. His words reflect his
artist's eye[:] "[I]t was a Monday morning, and, as is the custom of that plaza, dozens of weekend drunks were lying in various deathlike poses on the grass and across
the benches. The presence of these derelicts of an industrial age demonstrated that
life itself intrudes on the precise plan. No perfect order and no scheme of law, however wise, can escape the impact of the imperfect human being. We shall always be
engaged in reconciling the fixed system with the ever-present surges, demands and
travail of a struggling humanity. And in that legal process of reconciliation there
will always be those who see the beauty of the design and those who see the pathos of
the drunks." Mathew Tobriner was unique because he had the capacity both to see
the design and to feel the pathos.
Id. at 873-74.
21. CCNV, 104 S. Ct. at 3072.
22. Id. at 3073 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 3079 n.14, 3080.
24. 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
19.
20.
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registration requirements. 25 But whatever you think of the result, let me
ask you what you think of the Court's analysis when responding to the
argument that this rule discriminates against the poor. The Court's answer was brief and was contained in a single footnote written by the
Chief Justice: The policy treats all nonregistrants "alike," he said, "denying aid to both the poor and the wealthy." 2 6 It's true, but one wonders
if it captures the essence of the objection.
The Court's current approach has a tendency to flatten issues, to
squeeze the living complexity out of them, to extract the distributive dimension from them. Indeed, the cost-benefit mode of thought leads inexorably to a third sin: a fixation on the tangible, visible impacts of
challenged governmental practices, to the exclusion of such relative intangibles as the"comparative status or dignity of distinct groups in society. The tendency, of course, of all cost-benefit modes of analysis is to
simplify, to reduce to a common denominator, to a single value that one
then seeks to maximize. That, in turn, filters out textured aspects of a
problem. As I described it in an earlier article about the abuse of "Trial
By Mathematics," 27 the tendency is to dwarf soft variables, and it's an
even more pernicious tendency when it occurs in constitutional law than
when it occurs in environmental law or elsewhere. 28
There are dramatic current examples of that tendency beyond even
the criminal procedure and free speech cases. I have in mind two cases
decided recently by the Supreme Court. One, Lynch v. Donnelly,29 involved the official placement in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, at public expense and in a prominent place, of a nativity scene, a creche, not
paralleled by the holy scenes of any other religion. The other, Marsh v.
Chambers,30 involved official sponsorship of prayer by a minister-a
chaplain addressing the state legislature-at the start of each legislative
day.
The Court's approach in those cases was straightforward. It asked,
essentially: Do these practices tangibly harm nonbelievers? Are there
any real costs here? Do they harm believers of other faiths? The Court's
25. Id. at 3359.
26. Id. at 3359 n.17.
27. Tribe, TrialBy Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971).
28. See also Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972);
Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of InstrumentalRationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973); Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
29. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
30. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
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answers were predictable, given the questions: No, there is no concrete
harm, no measurable cost. Nonbelievers are, after all, not made into outsiders by these practices. It's their problem if they feel that way.
Does that remind you, perhaps, of the Supreme Court's "separate
but equal" phase in the days of Plessy v. Ferguson?3 I There the Supreme
Court had said, in essence: When we separate out the blacks, we don't
mean to say they're inferior; it's their problem if they put that paranoid
interpretation upon it. Justice O'Connor at least asked the right question
in Lynch. She asked whether nonadherents are sent a message by these
practices that they are "outsiders, not full members of the political community? '32 The problem, however-and the reason she essentially answered: No, there is no such message-is that she and the majority let
the insiders define what message the outsiders were getting. To the insiders it didn't seem offensive at all.
There is a pervasive pattern here-and I have in mind the current
debates about religion and politics, as well as what the Court has been
doing. When the government dons a cloak of religious sanctity and
points to its opponents to suggest they are unreligious, the cloak is least
likely to be visible, much less objectionable, to those who wear the same
colors.
Issues like this-worrying about what the relevant perspective is,
about whether we should look at things from the perspective of the insider or the outsider-don't fit at all well into the bureaucratic, technocratic, managerial, cost-benefit mode. How do you put a number on it?
How do you compare the costs and benefits of the insider and the outsider perspective? That, then, is the third sin: fixation on the tangible,
the visible.
There is a fourth. I would call it inviting "the tyranny of small decisions," a lovely phrase coined some time ago by the economist Alfred
Kahn. 33 He used the phrase to describe the fallacies of those economists
and managers who tend to look down at their feet to figure out how far
they've gone and where they're heading. It's not a very illuminating
view. They may think they've taken but a short step from where they
were just a moment ago; it's no surprise that, by the time they realize it,
they've departed a remarkable distance from their first premises.
Well, it's one thing for bureaucrats and engineers and managers to
be guilty of that sin-but for the institution which, above all, is supposedly committed to first principles to commit it poses, I think, a deeper
31.
32.
33.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
A. Kahn, 19 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. OF SOC. Sci. 23 (Fasc. 1, 1966).
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problem. The case of the Christmas creche, Lynch v. Donnelly,34 illustrated that problem. The Court there, having recently decided Marsh v.
Chambers35-the case that allowed ministers to be paid with tax money
for giving prayers at the beginning of a legislative session-loaded its
question (Are we really, concretely, harming the outsiders?) and asked
only if this marginal further step did more harm than good. The Justices
were looking at their feet and, I think, had little idea where they were
walking.
By the way, the fact that these examples almost all come from the
past Term should not lead you to believe that this has all happened overnight. It has been accumulating. But now, finally, I think a critical mass
has almost been reached. And so I focus on this Term because it's most
illustrative.
In Regan v. Wald,36 the Cuba travel case, the Court dealt with
something Congress had done several years ago. Congress had decided
in 1977 to end a great deal of the President's vague, emergency authority,
authority that the President had been invoking to regulate Americans
abroad under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.37 A number of
you may not know that large numbers of declared national emergencies,
tracing to World War II and other crises, had never been undeclared.
The President had all kinds of emergency powers, and after elaborate
hearings Congress decided to cut most of them off as of 1977. Congress
then created two tracks on which the President could thereafter proceed
to regulate such things as the travel of Americans abroad by regulating
their use of American currency. There was the "war" track and the
"peace" track; the tracks could hardly be more distinct. 38 On the "war"
track, the old, vague powers of the Trading with the Enemy Act remained. When we are in a state of war, the President has almost a blank
check. 39 But on the "peace" track, said Congress, the President can exercise such powers only by declaring a state of national emergency and,
to the degree possible, consulting with Congress. 4°
But Congress made an exception. It exempted existing exercises of
authority that were in place as of July 1, 1977 4 1-the so-called "grandfa34.
35.
36.
37.
95-223,
38.
39.
40.
41.

104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984).
103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983).
104 S.Ct. 3026 (1984).
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982) (amended by Act of December 28, 1977, Pub. L. No.
91 Stat. 1625).
Id. § 5(b) ("war track"); id. §§ 1701-1706 ("peace track").
Id. § 5(b).
Id. §§ 1701(a), 1703.
Id. § 5 note.
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ther clause." In Wald, the Supreme Court held, by a vote of five to four,
that President Reagan's 1982 ban on tourism to Cuba fit within the
grandfather clause. 42 Now that was an interesting holding because, on
July 1, 1977, there was no ban on travel to Cuba. And, to its credit, the
43
Administration did concede that much.
But it had two theories about why the grandfather clause applied.
Theory number one: when President Carter lifted the ban that had earlier existed on travel to Cuba, he was engaging in an "exercise of authority," and that "exercise" was in effect on July 1, 1977!44
Doublethink for 1984.
If you don't like that theory, there was another: something for everyone. The second theory declared: Oh, yes, there had been a ban in
effect on July 1, 1977. To be sure, it was not a ban on actual travel by
people. It was a ban on trade in commodities like cigars, 45 but. . . cigars, people ....

It's a small step. It's all just a marginal adjustment. In effect, the
Court held that Congress had really authorized the President to do what
I think a fair reading of the legislative history shows that Congress in
1977 fully intended to prevent the President from doing. My colleague
Paul Bator, then Deputy Solicitor General, in a public exchange of views
with me on this subject, 4 6 said that the two tracks were just technically
different. War and peace-technically different? Since Paul is not here
today, it's not fair for me to go on further. But I think the two tracks
could not have been more fundamentally different.
It's not hard to contrast this approach with that of the Warren
Court in the late '50s-in a case called Kent v. Dulles.47 The Court there
took the view that the liberty of international travel was so fundamental
to what it meant to be an American that this liberty could not be restricted by the executive without the clearest authorization by Congress. 48 Now ask yourself, in light of the debate here and the five to four
division on the Court, was there the clearest authorization by Congress
for what President Reagan did in 1982? Hardly. The Court's way of
coming out differently arises in part from a deferential attitude toward
the executive that is invited by a marginal cost-benefit approach. The
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

104 S. Ct. at 3033-35.
Id. at 3032-33.
Id. at 3034.
Id.
See ConstitutionalLaw Conference, 53 U.S.L.W. 2187, 2194 (Oct. 16, 1984).
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Id. at 129-30.
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Court didn't ask fundamental questions about what kind of country this
is when the President on his own authority can restrict international
travel. It asked instead whether people really are all that different from
cigars.
Now, of course, I do not suggest that the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States don't recognize the difference. But these are
decisions of the Court that are understandable only from a point of view
that is systematically blinded to what the difference means. Consider, for
example, the decisions about prisoners' rights, also from this Term. In
Hudson v. Palmer,49 the Court held that the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has no application
whatever to a prison cell, even if it's the cell of someone just awaiting
trial. In Block v. Rutherford,50 the Court held that prison authorities
have absolute discretion, even when there is no demonstrable security
problem, to prevent a prisoner from even touching his child during a
visit. Justice Stevens, in an impassioned dissent, said that the majority
had declared prisoners to be "little more than chattels." 51 The reduction
of people to objects, whether it's in the context of tourists and cigars or
prisoners and chattels, is easy to slip into if one approaches things
through the perspective of a cost-benefit manager and tries not to ask
fundamental questions about what sort of society we are, and what sort
of society we would like to become.
That leads to a fifth sin that I believe the current Court is committing-profoundly, frequently, and with devastating effect: the sin of
overlooking the constitutive dimension of government action, including
judicial action. That is, the Court is thinking of the actions challenged
before it purely in terms of the effects they will have out there in the
world in demonstrable ways, and not in terms of what they say about
who and what we are as a people and how they help to constitute us as a
nation.
Think again about the Christmas creche case 52 from that point of
view. What does it say about the nation that it feels comfortable making
people feel like outsiders and that it asks how they feel purely from the
comfortable position of those within? What does it say about the country
that we feel comfortable putting someone in prison as a result of an illegal search and seizure or an illegal interrogation?
You can't answer those questions by asking someone to compare the
49. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
50. 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984).
51. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3215 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984); see supra text accompanying note 29.
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costs and benefits of the alternatives. And there is a fundamental reason.
The reason is that comparing costs and benefits presupposes a given
schedule of how high or low various options should score on society's
scale, from the awful to the fantastic. But constitutional decisions alter
that very scale. They are like technologies that redesign human genetic
material. 53 When constitutional decisions are made, those decisions make
a statement to the country about what counts as a cost and what counts
as a benefit, about what we regard as a good and what we regard as an
evil.
To make that clearer, I think it would help to look more closely at
the criminal procedure cases, because there is a profound fallacy in the
Court's cost-benefit approach to search and seizure that has been overlooked in most of the commentary. So let me focus more closely upon
those cases. I'll do that by comparing the situation before and after the
Court's decision holding that, even though evidence was illegally seized,
it may nonetheless be admitted if the illegality resulted from a "reason54
able" mistake based upon an unlawful warrant.
The situation before that change, of course, was that the illegal
search and seizure occurred and a defendant, quite visibly guilty, was set
free. And the Court's reaction to that is, in substance: How awful.
That's a terrible thing. That's a cost. Are the benefits worth it?
Now ask yourself what happens when the Court moves to, one
might say, "de-awfulize" the situation. What's the situation when such
evidence becomes admissible? There are only two possibilities. One possibility is that the illegal searches and seizures will continue to occur
(because all of the hopeful predictions that we will find alternative ways
to deter them will prove false), and that guilty defendants will be jailed as
a direct and demonstrable result of violating the Constitution. We'll
have more people in jail because the Constitution was violated. Now is
that a net cost or a net benefit? It depends on what you think about the
Constitution, I would suppose.
But there is another possibility, the one that proponents of cutting
back the exclusionary rule stress. They claim that alternatives every bit
as effective as this awful exclusionary rule will be found that will deter
the illegal searches and seizures: the threat of suing the police officer, for
example, or altering the educational methods by which the police are
trained. Well, let's suppose they are right. Let's give them the benefit of
the doubt. If they are right, then what happens? What happens is that
53. See generally Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits
of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973).
54. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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the illegal search and seizure is not committed at all. The police don't
find the evidence. The defendant is not arrested. The crime, you will
notice, still goes unpunished.
But the public doesn't see a visibly guilty suspect going free. No one
sees the suspect; he hasn't even been arrested. The public is less upset
with the fourth amendment, less upset with the courts-but only because
it's fooled, only because it's deceived, only because the visible cost of letting the known defendant go has been transmuted into the invisible cost
of not picking him up off the street in the first place.
The current Court is telling us that this deception is a benefit. And
what does that in turn tell us about our conception of ourselves and of
the Constitution? The real issue in the exclusionary rule cases is not the
marginal balance of costs and benefits in terms of incremental deterrence.
It is the virtue of fooling ourselves about the price we pay for having a
Constitution that says that, in some circumstances, you're not supposed
to engage in a particular search or seizure.
What the Court has done-when even most commentators on these
decisions seem not to notice the trickery-is, in a subtle way, to redefine
our conception of ourselves. The Court is telling us we're a society that
wants to be fooled. We don't want to see the spectacle of the defendant
going free.
So the real issue in cases like the exclusionary rule case is: What
kind of society do we want to be? Do we want openly and visibly to pay
the price for our fourth amendment-perhaps even to amend the Constitution to get rid of that amendment if we don't like the price we pay? Or
do we want to push it under the rug? It is quite typical, I think, of the
cost-benefit mode of analysis that these constitutive issues-What kind of
society do we become when we declare what is a cost and what is a benefit?-are submerged.
It is typical of the cost-benefit perspective that the Court takes the
step it chooses to take-whether in upholding the ban on travel to Cuba
in Regan v. Wald, 55 or in chipping away at the core of the exclusionary
rule in United States v. Leon, 56 or in placing religious symbols in official
positions of authority in a case like Lynch v. Donnelly 57-without really
asking what its steps are doing to our conception of who and what we
are, how the Court's choices are reconstituting our polity. And then the
Court blames whatever happens on someone else. That is, the Court will
say in a case like Leon: Oh, it's the text of the fourth amendment that
55.
56.
57.

104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
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we're neutrally enforcing. The fourth amendment says that people shall
be secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures." It says nothing
about the exclusion of evidence. Of course, that depends on what you
think it means to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court is making a choice but not acknowledging it.
Or take the legislative chaplain case. 58 The Court blames it all on
history. It says that, back then, when they wrote these things, they had
legislative chaplains. They didn't seem to mind. And so history has de59
cided the matter for us.

Well, those who wrote the fourteenth amendment had segregated
public schools, too; they didn't seem to mind. But we are not ruled from
the grave by the unexpressed intentions of the Framers. We are ruled by
a Constitution, and we must choose to give that Constitution content and
accept responsibility for that choice. Cost-benefit analysis is a profoundly
simple way of escaping responsibility. Others have struck the balance for
us: the Framers, by the words they wrote or the intentions they held;
history, by the practices it has condoned; Congress, by what it didn't
6°
quite say, but what we can say it said in a case like Regan v. Wald.
That leads to the sixth deadly sin committed by those who take this
cost-benefit perspective: abdicating responsibility for choice. That, I
think, is the great appeal of all fundamental faiths, including faith in
technical expertise and in methods like cost-benefit analysis. They enable
each of us to don a mantle that says, "I didn't do it." They create an
illusion, a comforting illusion, of inexorability.
There are examples on both the right and the left in the Burger era.
Let me begin with one that is a favorite decision of many liberals, Roe v.
Wade, 6' holding that legal obstacles to early abortion are unconstitutional. In its opinion, the Court stressed the role of medical expertise.
Indeed, despite the desire of some to read the case as an affirmation of the
rights of women, it is uncomfortable to note that the Court principally
talks about the rights of doctors (and of the women that doctors serve) to
decide, in their own professional judgment, when a pregnancy really
ought to be terminated. Indeed, the Court's elaborately medical trimesterization of pregnancy in Roe v. Wade involves the same kind of abdication to expertise. The Court says that the state does not have a
compelling interest in protecting the fetus until it is "viable," and it defines "viable" in medical terms-i.e., in terms of capacity to survive in an
58.
59.
60.

Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 30.
103 S. Ct. at 3332-36.
104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984); see supra notes 36-45 & accompanying text.
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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incubator outside the woman's uterus. 62 Why precisely does the magic
moment of compelling interest occur just at viability and not before or
after? The Court offers only this "reason": Because, after viability, the
63
fetus can survive in a hospital, outside the uterus.
That's a definition, not a reason. But it's easier to offer a definition;
to point to the medical profession and its consensus; in effect, to blame
"science" for a definition and a decision which, if defensible (and I believe it was, although it's hardly an easy one), was defensible only because it helped to empower women in society by putting them on a more
equal footing with men. Men don't have to be involuntary incubators,
even for their own children. If Roe v. Wade was right, that's why it was
right-not because of what doctors think or what medical science
describes.
There are prices we pay when we defend rights for the wrong reasons, by resting them on a quicksand of someone else's expertise. Quite
predictably, Congress can come along and say, "We're just as smart as
the doctors. In fact, we'll have a lot of doctors testify. Then we'll announce that we've learned a lot about the fetus. And we'll pass a Human
Life Bill that undoes all the Court did-and without even a constitutional amendment." That has not yet succeeded. But, in a way, the
Court has asked for it-by abdicating responsibility for choice.
Now take an example not from the left but from the right. Seven
years after Roe v. Wade, in the case of Harris v. McRae,64 the Courthaving earlier decided that women have a right to terminate their
pregnancies-held that it is permissible to withhold public funding from
abortions for the poor, even when the same poor women would get even
more public money for having children. Why is that permissible? How
is it reconcilable with Roe v. Wade? Well, the Court's answer is simple:
The government intervened in the decision of the pregnant woman to end
her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade. But it wasn't the government that caused
the woman's poverty in Harrisv. McRae. Poverty, you see, is just a natural, background fact. Some people just happen to be poor. 65 But notice
that it is the law-when it says that, if you don't have the money, abortion will not be available-that transmutes poverty into medical and social reality. It is the law, by establishing an elaborate system of privately
62. Id. at 163.
63. Id.
64. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
65. Id. at 316 ("[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's
exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency
falls in the latter category.").
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financed and privately available medical care, that decides to put
medicine on the auction block. That's a decision of the legal and political
structure. Michael Walzer's seminal book, Spheres of Justice,6 6 makes
the argument that, when a society transmutes one good thing (namely,
money) into virtually all good things-by preventing those without
money from acquiring those things-we should not fool ourselves into
thinking that it is nature that has decreed the outcome. 67 So too, by
placing the right to end pregnancy on the wrong basis, on a basis of professional expertise plus personal privacy, the Court boxed itself into a
corner, all but gutting the core meaning of the right originally proclaimed. The Supreme Court of California, 68 and several other state
courts, 69 have resisted that path by finding in state constitutions a right
to funding for abortion if funding is available for childbirth.
Abdicating responsibility for choice, then, is a characteristic sin of
the current Court. And I think it is useful, at least for me in remembering my days with Mat Tobriner, to recall what, for him, was part of the
antidote. It was, as many things were for Mat, deceptively simple.
"Don't use the passive voice," he would say. David Balabanian, my
friend and predecessor as one of Justice Tobriner's law clerks, has perceptively noted, in his memorial essay for the judge, how important that
advice was: 70 Don't use the passive voice. It makes it look as though
someone out there, unspecified, is doing it to us. Admit that it's we who
are doing it.
There is a final irony and a final sin: that denying responsibility for
choice makes it easier for judges to seize power as well as to share it with
the executive branch. The seventh deadly sin, then: indulging judicial
imperialism, masquerading as modesty or strict construction.
In case you hadn't noticed it, we now have a highly activist Supreme
Court. In Buckley v. Valeo,7 1 for example, the Burger Court struck down
Congress' one comprehensive attempt to regulate campaign finance by
limiting how much those with money can dominate the political process.
And Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,72 in one fell
66.
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67. Id. at 97-122.
68. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981) (Tobriner, J.).
69. See, e.g., Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); cf. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Department of Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984) (decision affirmed on statutory grounds).
70. See Balabanian,Justice Was More Than His Title, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 878, 879 (1982).
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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swoop, struck down more acts of Congress than all preceding Supreme
Courts combined had done in all their days-and did so for rather
wooden and formalistic reasons. Regan v. Wald,73 too, was an activist
decision insofar as it paid little real attention to the manifest intentions of
Congress in cutting back executive power in 1977. Finally, in deciding
Roe v. Wade, 74 the Court may have believed there would be less uproar
because it could attribute to others the choice it had made.
Unhinged from the discipline of conceding that it is making constitutional choices, the Court readily seizes power and says that it is just
carrying out one neutral method or another. And the underlying program of the method, when it is married to cost-benefit analysis, is more
likely than not to be the aggrandizement of authority for those who already wield enormous power-whether in the medical profession, in the
executive bureaucracy, or in the corporate world of wealth and
75
privilege.
The ultimate point is fairly simple. It is that constitutional law is
emptied of its critical force, its capacity to challenge existing patterns of
authority and power, when it is filtered through a utilitarian screen that
makes courts into mere cost-benefit calculators and interest-balancers.
So there we have it. Seven dangers of pseudo-science in constitutional law: devaluing process; ignoring the distribution of power and
wealth; becoming fixated on the tangible; inviting the tyranny of small
decisions; overlooking what ultimately matters most, the constitutive dimension of what we do; abdicating responsibility for choice; indulging in
hidden judicial imperialism.
My position is not, surely, that courts, or anyone for that matter,
should ignore consequences and make constitutional choices in a vacuum
unhinged from reality. It is the Book of Luke that asks: "Which of you,
intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the
cost?" 76 That's fair enough.
But my message is that we'd better count with full recognition that
the tower we are building is one that we will have to live in, and not just
observe from afar. When it is, in John Marshall's deathless phrase, "a
constitution we are expounding, ' '7 7 we had best remember that it is ourselves that we are constituting. To forget that is to forget, in the name of
counting, all that really counts. To say that any one of our deepest con73.
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75. See generally L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985).
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stitutional commitments-and I quote the Court-"cannot pay its
way," 7 8 as though our scale of costs and benefits were already out there,
and not something that we are in the process of constructing, is to exalt
the price of everything and the value of nothing.
How are we to react to the specter of a Supreme Court moving in
this direction? Surely we could retreat to cynicism, accepting for the rest
of our lives the inevitability of a moral vacuum, one pulling us all toward
constituted authority even in our nation's court of last resort. Or we
could believe that the Justices may not have fully appreciated what they
are doing. They are not, after all, evil men and women. They may simply be captives of an ideology that we are capable of exposing, and thus
of helping them-the Justices themselves-to defeat. We can, in other
words, keep the faith, and keep arguing with passion for the constitutional choices in which we believe and of which we dare to think we can
convince others. We can take either path.
I ask myself what Mat Tobriner, that gentle and wise man with a
passion for justice, would do. Would he be cynical? Or would he keep
trying? And then I know what I must do. I commend to you Robert
Frost's teasing question in his poem, The Black Cottage:
[W]hy abandon a belief
Merely because it ceases to be true.
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt
It will turn true again . . .79
So let me end as I began-with a few words from Tennyson's
Ulysses:
Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world...
Though much is taken, much abides; and though
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are,
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in 8will
0
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

78. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413 n.6 (1984) (White, J.) (finding that the
exclusionary rule "can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situations under
consideration in this case" and thus "cannot pay its way").
79. R. FROST, The Black Cottage, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 58 (E. Lathem ed.
1969).
80. Tennyson, supra note 2, at 402-03.

